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Abstract:   We present evidence on the objective function of bank management--that is, are
they risk neutral and maximize expected profits, or are they risk averse and trade off profit
for risk reduction?  We extend the model of Hughes and Mester (1993) to allow a bank's
choice of its financial capital level to reflect its preference for return versus risk.  A
multiproduct cost function, which incorporates asset quality and the risk faced by a bank's
uninsured depositors, is derived from a model of utility maximization.  The utility function
represents the bank management's preferences defined over asset levels, asset quality,
capital level and profit.  Endogenizing the bank's choice of capital level in this way permits
the demand for financial capital to deviate from its cost-minimizing level.  The model
consists of the cost function, share equations and demand for financial capital equation,
which are estimated jointly.  We then are able to explicitly test whether bank managers are
acting in shareholders' interest and maximizing expected profits, or whether they are
maximizing a utility function that exhibits risk aversion.  We believe this is the first such
test.
JEL Classification Numbers:  G2, D2EVIDENCE ON THE OBJECTIVES OF BANK MANAGERS
1. Introduction
Are bank managers risk neutral and act on behalf of shareholders to maximize expected profits,
or are they risk averse and maximize a utility function that trades off profits for risk reduction? The aim
of this paper is to present some empirical evidence on this question by looking at a bank’s choice of
inputs, in particular, its choice of financial capital. Since increasing financial capital reduces the risk of
insolvency, bank managers might choose levels of financial capital that are higher than the cost-
minimizing (and therefore, profit-maximizing) levels. To shed light on this, we extend the model of
Hughes and Mester (1993) to allow a bank’s choice of its financial capital level to reflect its preference
for return versus risk. A multiproduct cost function, which incorporates asset quality and the risk faced
by a bank’s uninsured depositors, is derived from a model of utility maximization. An explicit test of
bank managers’ objective function is then derived. We believe this is the first explicit test of bank
managers’ objectives concerning the risk vs. return tradeoff.
Most studies of bank costs estimate cost functions that do not account for the quality of a bank’s
assets or the risk faced by the bank’s uninsured depositors, both of which influence cost in a variety of
ways.
l First, to the extent that uninsured depositors exact a risk premium, the cost of uninsured deposits
will be affected by the bank’s risk. Hannan and Hanweck (1988) report empirical evidence that the
interest expense of uninsured deposits does indeed contain a risk premium.
Second, if different combinations of inputs that produce a given vector of outputs imply different
degrees of risk, then a bank that is not risk neutral will not necessarily choose the least costly mix. For
example, the amount of resources the bank devotes to credit analysis and monitoring will affect its credit
risk. Additionally, the amount of financial capital the
outputs directly affects its risk of insolvency. Financial
bank employs to produce any given vector of
capital is an alternative to deposits as a source
lExceptions include Hughes (1989), Gertler and Waldman (1990), Hughes and Mester (1993), and
McAllister and McManus (1993).2
of loanable funds, and for some banks, capital notes as well as other sources of capital may be cheaper
than core deposits. However, financial capital is more than a source of funding; it is also a cushion
against insolvency. Thus, the economic calculation of capital adequacy may require an accounting of risk
when the bank is not risk neutral. While the usual moral hazard story is that bank stockholders, who
have limited liability, desire more risk than is socially optimal, bank managers may have incentives to
take on less risk in order to preserve the bank and therefore, their jobs, particularly in the recent
environment of consolidation.
As in Hughes and Mester (1993), to allow for the possibility that the level of capitalization is not
chosen to minimize cost, the cost function is made conditional on financial capital. But this paper extends
Hughes and Mester by embedding the problem of cost minimization in a model of utility maximization,
which is constructed to allow the demand for financial capital to deviate from its cost-minimizing level.
The utility function represents the bank management’s preferences defined over asset levels, asset
quality, capitalization, and profit. Utility is maximized subject to a “budget” or profit constraint and the
conditional values of asset levels and asset quality to obtain the demand for financial capital and profit.
Hence, the bank’s choice between capitalization and profit can be viewed as one of risk versus return.
Substituting the demand for financial capital into the conditional cost function, the employment of
financial capital is made endogenous. (Asset quality can also be made endogenous in this fashion.) Note
that the resulting reduced-form cost function will contain not just the usual arguments of input prices and
output levels, but also arguments derived for the revenue function. Cost, then, depends on revenue as
well. Thus, an explicit test for bank managers’ objective function is obtained: if cost depends on
revenue, bank managers are acting in a risk-averse manner and maximizing a utility function that trades
off risk and return; if cost is independent of revenue, then bank managers are acting in a risk-neutral
manner and maximizing expected profits.3
One interpretation of the model is that it explicitly models a kind of X-inefficiency. That is,
because a bank may desire to trade off risk and return, it may not use the cost minimizing level of
financial capital. Thus, we are offering an explanation of why some banks may appear X-inefficient.
This seems preferable to the usual black-box approach to X-inefficiency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses bank production and cost
structures that explicitly take into account the quality of output and insolvency risk. Section 3 discusses
the bank’s demand for financial capital. Section 4 derives the cost function when the capital choice of
the bank is determined endogenously. Section 5 discusses empirical implementation of the model.
Section 6 gives formulas for the cost statistics we examine. The empirical results are discussed in Section
7 and Section 8 concludes.
2. Bank Production and Cost
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Let the bank’s technology be summarized by the transformation function T(y,q,x,u,k) = 0, where
y is a vector of quantities of outputs; q is a vector of variables characterizing output quality; u is
uninsured deposits; x is a vector of inputs other than u; and k is a vector consisting of kl, debt-based
financial capital (subordinated debt), and k2, equity-based financial capital and loan-loss reserves.
T(y,q,x,u,k) describes the production possibilities set, and is nondecreasing in x, u, and k, and
nonincreasing in y and q. Additionally, T(y,q,x,u,k) is strictly quasi-concave in x, u, and k so that the
input requirement sets, V(y,q)   {(x,u,k): T(x,u,k;y,q) = 0}, which describe the set of all inputs
needed to produce output quantities y with qualities
concave in y and q so that the production possibility
convex.
q, are strictly convex, and the restricted input
 are strictly convex. T(y,q,x,u,k) is quasi-
2This section closely follows Hughes and Mester (1993).4
We assume banks are price-takers in the markets for inputs included in x so that the
corresponding price vector w is competitively determined. The price of uninsured deposits, wu , is also
assumed to be competitively determined; however, if it includes a risk premium, then it may be affected
by the bank’s risk of failure as reflected in the quality, q, of its outputs, by its capitalization, k, relative
affect the transformation function.
3 Thus, let wu
4 The cost of production is
defined by,
Conditioning cost on the bank’s financial capital, k, has several advantages. First, it
acknowledges that financial capital influences cost, since it provides an alternative to deposits as a source
of loanable funds. Second, since the level, and not the price, is employed in the cost function, it does
not assume that the level of financial capital is cost-minimizing. Allowance is thus made for objectives
-minimization. Third, to the extent that credit risk varies by asset type, the degree of risk other than cost
Allowing cost to depend on k rather than just the aggregated capital-asset ratio takes this into account.
The formulation in equation (1) exhibits all the standard properties of a cost function. It should
be noted, however, that this is a partially reduced-form cost function, obtained by substituting in the price
3Hannan and Hanweck (1988) find evidence that the mean and variance of profit affect the premium
variables.
4This approach to the specification of an input price is suggested by Diewert (1982), who considered
the case of a monopsony where the price is influenced by endogenous variables.5
of uninsured deposits into the structural cost function. Since the price of uninsured deposits depends on
explicitly appear in the cost function.
5 Since wu does not explicitly appear, we cannot use Shephard’s
lemma to derive the cost share for uninsured deposits in the usual way. However, we can use a variant
Envelope Theorem, to yield,
(2)
Hence:
or, in terms of the uninsured deposits cost share equation:
(3)
(4)
The expression in equation (4) suggests that the application of this variant of Shephard’s lemma to a
uninsured deposits.
6
5The structural cost function is a function of (y,q,w,wu,k). Substituting wu, which is a function of
fully reduced-form cost function is obtained by substituting the demand for capital, k, into the partially
6In the estimation described below, since the cost shares sum to one, one of the cost share equations
must be dropped to avoid singularity of the variance-covariance matrix. We drop the uninsured deposits
cost share equation.6
3. Demand for Financial Capital
Taking the vectors of outputs and their quality characteristics as given, the riskiness of the bank’s
portfolio is established. The effect of this risk on the probability of failure, and hence the security of the
deposits, is influenced by the level and mix of financial capital. Financial capital provides a buffer
against default. We assume the management has well-behaved preferences for financial capital and profit,
given its mix of assets, y, and their quality characteristics, q. Before completing the formulation of the
managerial utility function, we consider the definition of profit.
3.1 Profit
To calculate profit, the cost of capital, vlkl + v2k2, must be added to cost in equation (l). The
to normalize profit when it is an argument of the utility function. Consequently, a proportional variation
and hence, utility. In other words, normalized profit
variation in prices has no effect on normalized profit, which is an argument in the utility function; hence
it will have no effect on the utility-maximizing level of financial capital.
It will be useful to define accounting profit, or net income, as well as economic profit. Economic
profit is defined by,
7In the empirical implementation, we treat pi as exogenous. Alternatively, one could endogenize the
a particular type of loan, then the interest rate on the loan is inversely related to the quality of the loan7
(5)
while accounting profit, or net income, is defined by,
(6)
3.2 Utility
The bank’s preferences for profit, capitalization, quality, and size can be characterized by a twice-
respect to profit and capitalization, subject to the budget constraint equation (5) and the vectors of
outputs, y, and quality characteristics, q. A unique solution to the maximization problem will require
that the cost function be strictly convex in k and, when q is also endogenous, in q.
This formulation of utility is quite general in that it accommodates various alternative objectives
of the bank. If the bank maximizes profit, then q, y, and k will have no marginal effect on utility except
through their effect on profit. On the other hand, the bank may maximize its rate of return on equity
Holding the levels of outputs, qualities, and debt-based financial capital constant, and maximizing utility
with respect to k2, Figure 1 illustrates an equilibrium k2
1 in which utility maximization corresponds to
profit maximization and equilibrium k2
2 in which profit is traded for extra capital and, in effect, for extra
security. Since the cost function is assumed to be convex in k2, the profit function is concave in k2. The
indifference curve U
1 gives no marginal significance to k2 and, thus, yields the profit maximum as a
utility maximum. The indifference curve U
2 attributes marginal significance to both profit and capital
and so results in a utility maximum where profit is traded for lower risk. U
2 represents the preferences
of risk-averse bank managers.8
focus of decision-making. The level k2
3, which maximizes the rate of return, implies risk neutrality.
In this case, indifference curves, such as U
3, are rays from the origin. On the other hand, risk aversion
results in the trading of return for the safety of a greater capital cushion, say k2
4 or k2
5. It is not difficult
to show that when the rate of return rather than profit is the bank’s concern and bank management is risk
averse, then the indifference curves can be positively sloped (e.g., U
4) or negatively sloped (e.g., U
5).
Thus, the formation of the bank’s objectives in terms of the utility function is sufficiently general to
include a variety of objectives and attitudes toward risk.
The bank’s use of financial capital is subject to regulatory review; therefore, we must incorporate
constraints defining the minimum capital adequacy level imposed by regulation. For generality, assume
is assumed to contain the bank’s assets as some or all of its components, then we can denote the
The demands for debt-based
from the solution to the problem,
and equity-based financial capital and for economic profit follow
(7)9
Substituting these demand functions into equation (6)
4. Cost with Endogenous Financial Capital: A Test for the Bank Managers’s Objective Function
Substituting the demand functions for financial capital, k
m(y,z,m), into the cost function (1) yields
cost that is unrestricted by capital,
(8)
Note that when financial capital affects utility marginally, i.e., when profit is traded for a
reduction in risk, or when the bank’s objective is evaluated in terms of the rate of return on financial
capital, the cost function (8) contains arguments characterizing revenue.
8 Hence, the revenue the bank
can obtain by producing any given vector of outputs, y, at given quality, q, affects the bank’s
capitalization and the cost of producing the given vectors y and q. On the other hand, when utility
maximization corresponds to profit maximization, which also implies risk neutrality, financial capital will
be employed only to the point of minimizing cost. Thus, revenue consideration will be irrelevant to this
optimum. That is, when the bank maximizes profit, then given the bank’s output, y, and quality, q, the
revenue parameters p and m will not have any effect on cost. Thus, to test whether bank managers are
maximizing profits or maximizing a utility function that trades off profits for risk reduction, we estimate
the elasticities of cost with respect to p and m, taking into account the endogeneity of k. If these
elasticities are non-zero, then this is evidence that managers are risk-averse and that they maximize utility.
5. Empirical Implementation
Estimation of cost function (8) relies on the basic conditional cost function
conditioned on the characteristics of quality and on the level
8The concept of revenue-driven cost is developed in greater
of financial capital. In
detail in Hughes (1989).
(l), which is
principle, the10
conditional cost function is estimated jointly with its
maximizing demand equations for profit, debt-based
share equations and with a system of utility-
financial capital, and equity capital. In the
estimation described below, we used a somewhat simpler formulation to meet the limitations imposed by
the data and the number of parameters.




We make the following simplifications. First, since nearly half of the banks in our sample do
not have subordinated debt, the two types of financial capital are aggregated. Second, since estimating
the behavior of costs does not require estimating the demand equation for profit, the profit function is
dropped. Other simplifications and details are discussed below.
5.1 Data
We used 1989 and 1990 data from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income that banks
must file each quarter. The 286 banks included in the sample are all the U.S. banks that operated in
branch-banking states and that reported over $1 billion in assets as of 1988Q4, excluding the special-
purpose Delaware banks chartered under that state’s Financial Center Development Act and Consumer
Credit Bank Act. We exclude banks in unit-banking states and the Delaware legislated banks to help11
control for the regulatory environment.
9 The banks included in the sample ranged from $1 billion to





include five outputs in the model: yl = real estate loans, y2 = business
and industrial loans, lease financing receivables, and agricultural loans), y3
loans (i.e.,
= loans to
y4 = other loans, and y5 = securities, assets in trading accounts, fed funds sold and
securities purchased under agreements to resell, and total investment securities. Each yi is measured as
the average of its dollar amount at the end of 1990 and its dollar amount at the end of 1989.
Since 138 banks in the sample have no subordinated debt, we aggregate the two categories of
financial capital; hence, k is the average volume of equity capital, loan-loss reserves, and subordinated
debt in 1990.
Four inputs, in addition to uninsured deposits and financial capital, are considered: (1) labor,
(2) physical capital, (3) insured deposits, and (4) other borrowed money. The corresponding input prices
are: wl
expense in 1990
1990, w2 = occupancy
(interest paid on small
9In addition, a few banks were dropped because of missing or misreported data.
10It could be that banks with less than the regulatory required level of capital are unable to choose
their capital levels, because it is being dictated by the regulators. The regulatory capital requirement in
1990 was capital to total assets of at least 6 percent. Only two banks in the sample had capital ratios less
than 6 percent, and dropping these banks from the sample does not qualitatively change any of the results
reported below. As of 1992, when risk-based capital standards came into effect, total capital to risk-
adjusted assets was required to be at least 8 percent. While we could not compute risk-adjusted assets
(since the banks did not have to report this on their Call Reports in 1990), we did check to see whether
dropping banks with total capital to total assets under 8 percent (a stricter requirement than the risk-based
standard) affected our results. Dropping these banks from the sample does not qualitatively change any
of the results reported below.
1lThis measure of the unit price of physical capital has been used in many other cost studies,
including Hughes and Mester (1993), Mester (1991), and Hunter, Timme, and Yang (1990). As an
alternative, the rental cost per square foot of office space at the bank’s headquarters location could be
used. However, it is not clear this would be a better proxy, since many of the banks in the sample have
many branches at various locations. While in theory one could use the average rental cost over all
markets in which the bank operates, data on branch location were not available.12
deposits [i.e., under $100,000] in 1990
average volume of interest-bearing deposits less CDs over $100,000 in 1990, w4 = total expense of fed
funds purchased, securities sold under agreements to repurchase, obligations to the U.S. Treasury, and
average volume of these types of funds in 1990.
The price of uninsured deposits, wu
l-year, 5-year, and l0-year Treasury securities in 1990, where the weights are calculated as the
proportion of the bank’s large time deposits with the corresponding maturity. The risk premium is
incorporated into the conditional cost function and so does not explicitly appear.
12
The price of financial capital, v
no maturity and so is assumed to be the same across banks; thus, it does not appear in the estimation.
of financial capital, nor the price of uninsured deposits appears explicitly in the model.
The prices of the outputs, p, are measured by dividing total interest income derived from each
output by the average dollar amount of assets that are accruing interest in the output category in 1990.
Accruing assets in category i equal total assets in category i less assets not accruing interest in category
that the bank’s potential interest income is p Ž y,  the amount that would be received if all assets were
accruing. This distinction is important in interpreting the revenue arguments of the “budget” constraint
12Hughes and Mester (1993) developed a test to determine whether deposits are outputs or inputs.
A variable cost (VC) function in which insured and uninsured deposits are entered in levels is estimated.
If the derivative of VC with respect to insured deposits is positive, then insured deposits are an output;
if the derivative is negative, then insured deposits are an input. The same test can be applied for
uninsured deposits. Using a data set similar to the one employed here, Hughes and Mester (1993) found
that both types of deposits were inputs. Hence, we treat them as inputs here as well.13
in the utility-maximizing solution. Noninterest income, m, is measured by the amount of noninterest
income for 1990.
The utility-maximizing solution contains arguments of the revenue function p Ž y  + m. To
empirically implement the model, we need to consider whether to use realized or potential revenue. Since
the bank’s choice is described as one between potential return and risk, it would seem appropriate to
measure revenue (and profit) as the potential rather than the realized value, i.e., the value of revenue and
return needed to compensate the bank for the risk it assumes. The potential value can be viewed as a
proxy for the expected revenue or profit.
demand for capital is captured by including
The effect of potential revenue on the utility-maximizing
among its arguments the vector of interest rates earned by
accruing assets, p, and noninterest income, m.
The quality of assets might be measured quite directly by the risk premium on each type of asset.
Unfortunately, the data do not permit this calculation. Therefore, we include one quality variable, q,
measured as the average total volume of nonperforming loans, i.e., loans past due 30 days or more plus
measured by the standard deviation of the bank’s yearly net income from 1986-1990.
section model.
Finally, conditional cost, C, in equation (9), is measured by the sum of salaries and benefits,
occupancy expense, and (interest paid on insured and uninsured deposits net of service charges, and the
13As discussed in Hughes and Mester (1993), this is an ex post measure of quality rather than an ex
ante measure—not all low quality loans end up being nonperforming loans, and not all loans that are
performing well today will continue to do so—but it seems to be the best available measure of the
resources that went into monitoring the bank’s loans. Also note that while the quantity of a bank’s
nonperforming loans will be influenced by the macroeconomy, its cross-sectional variation measures
differences in quality across the banks.14
expenses of fed funds purchased, securities sold under agreements to repurchase, obligations to the U.S.
Treasury, and other borrowed money) x (total loans and securities/total earning assets).
Table 1 summarizes the data for our sample.
5.2 Functional Form
We use the translog functional form for cost function given in equation (9). And we assume the
demand for financial capital is log-linear. Thus, the model, which consists of the conditional cost
function, the cost share equations for the 4 inputs other than uninsured deposits, and the demand for










quantity of output i, i= 1,...,5
price of input j (other than uninsured deposits),





price of output i, i= 1,...,5
j=l,...4
j
th cost share, i.e., expenditures on input j divided by conditional cost, j= 1, . . . ,4
and all variables (except the shares) are normalized by their means.
We allow the correlation of error terms on the cost function, share equations, and financial capital
equation to be nonzero for any bank, but we assume the correlation is zero across banks. Since ln k is
an endogenous variable that appears in the cost and share equations, we use iterative three-stage least
squares to estimate the model. All the exogenous variables in the model as well as their squares and
cross-products are used as instruments. (The squares and cross-products are uses since the square of the16
endogenous variable, i.e., (ln k)
2 appears in the cost equation (see Kelejian, 1971 and Greene, 1993, p.
609). The estimates we obtain are asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood estimates.
14
Once the model is estimated, reduced-form coefficients can be calculated by substituting the
demand for financial capital equation (15) into the cost and share equations. These coefficients can then
be used to calculate certain characteristics like economies of scale and scope, input demand elasticities,
and so on, taking into account the endogeneity of financial capital.
Note that it is possible to estimate the fully reduced-form cost model obtained by substituting
equation (15) into the cost equation and share equations and then estimate the reduced-form using iterative
seemingly unrelated regression estimation. A problem with doing this, however, is that the cost
function’s linear homogeneity in input prices cannot be imposed, so information is lost. Thus, we prefer
to estimate the structural model.
15
6. Cost Statistics
Our measure of scale economies takes into account asset quality, along with the endogeneity of
financial capital. If quality is appropriately considered relative to asset size, then a variation in any
output level yi is a variation in the i
th individual quality-asset ratio (i.e., q/yi) and also in the aggregate
traditional scale economies measure does not hold quality constant. Following Mester and Hughes
(1993), we derive a scale economies measure that holds quality constant, while taking into account the
endogeneity of financial capital by substituting (14) into (12), and
proportionate variation in the levels of all outputs in y and quality,
then considering the effect of a
q, on cost. Essentially, we are
14We are currently investigating whether the financial capital equation should include higher ordered
terms, and whether the results are robust to a change in specification.
15Results regarding scale and scope economies based on the fully reduced-form cost function are
similar to those reported in the text based on the cost model consisting of equations (12), (13), and (14).17
measuring scale economies using C
m given in equation (8) (and taking into account quality). Consider
differentiating with respect to a scaled variation in y and q yields,




It might be interesting to compare this scale measure with those obtained if we neglect to control




PARTSCALE1 is similar to the scale economies measure used in previous studies, in the sense that it
does not take into account how the bank’s capital choice changes as output level changes, nor does it hold
output quality constant as output level changes. (Of course, since we include financial capital and quality
measures in our cost function while previous studies did not, our estimate of PARTSCALE1 need not be
the same as estimates of scale economies in previous studies.) PARTSCALE2 takes into account the
endogeneity of k, but does not hold quality constant. PARTSCALE3 holds quality constant, but does not
take into account the endogeneity of k.
In addition to economies of scale, we also measure within-sample economies of scope, allowing
the financial capital level to change endogenously as output changes. (That is, when measuring scope
economies we evaluate cost at the bank’s chosen financial capital level associated with each output level.)
Within-sample economies of scope exist between outputs when the cost of producing them together in a
single firm is less than the cost of producing them in firms that specialize in one of each of the outputs,
but are not more specialized than the most specialized firm in the sample being studied [see Mester (1991,
1992)]. For five outputs, the degree of within-sample global economies of scope evaluated at y is defined
as
(20)
minimum value of yi in the sample.
16 Note that the scope measures treat k endogenously by
within the sample for each output i and so avoids problems associated with extrapolating outside the
specialized firms equals y, the point at which we are evaluating scope economies. For n outputs, we
The insignificant WSCOPEij measures not reported in Table 4 are
available from the authors.19
within-sample economies of scope specific to a subset T of N outputs at y is defined as
(21)
T.
As a robustness check on our scope economies measures, we also look at cost complementarities,
which again permit the level of financial capital to adjust optimally as output varies. A sufficient
condition for scope economies to exist at output vector, y, is that there are weak cost complementarities
measure the complementarily between outputs i and j by
(22)
where the derivatives of ln C in equation (19) treat k as a function of output and permit it to change as
output changes.
7. Empirical Results
Parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit measures are reported in Table 2. Since the cost function
is not homothetic, cost statistics, like scale and scope economies, will vary with the levels of the
exogenous variables. Therefore, the statistics reported in Tables 3 and 4 are evaluated at the mean levels20
of the exogenous variables for banks in four size categories that correspond to the sample quartiles
statistics evaluated at the mean levels of the exogenous variables for the entire size range of banks. Since
these cost statistics are nonlinear functions of the parameters, standard errors are approximated by
expanding each statistic as a Taylor series, dropping terms of order 2 or higher, and using the standard
variance formula for linear functions of estimated parameters.
7.1 Demand for Financial Capital
The parameters in the demand for financial capital equation give the elasticity of demand with
respect to the variables in the demand function. As expected, the elasticity of demand for financial capital
with respect to each output is positive (see estimates Al,...,A5), and significantly so for each output
except loans to individuals. The elasticities with respect to all input prices except labor are negative; the
other borrowed money elasticity (i.e., B4) is significantly different from zero. This suggests that other
borrowed money is a substitute for financial capital. The other significant elasticities are those with
respect to q, m, p2, p4, and p5. Rq is significantly positive, which means that an increase in the volume
of nonperforming loans implies an increase in the demand for financial capital, which seems reasonable.
The fact that elements of the revenue function, i.e., m, p2, p4, and p5, have a significant effect on
financial capital, k, given output and quality, suggests banks may not be simple cost minimizers, but
rather that they might be maximizing utility, which is a function of risk and return. We next examine
whether these revenue variables have a significant effect on cost, via their effect on financial capital. If
so, this can be interpreted as evidence of utility maximization.
7.2 Bank Managers’ Objectives: Utility vs. Profit Maximization
Table 3 presents the elasticities of cost with respect to revenue variables, taking into account the
endogeneity of k. As shown there, for banks in the three smallest size categories, i.e., with assetsbetween $1
q constant.
21
billion and $6.72 billion, revenue variables have a significant impact on costs, holding y and
This is evidence that managers at these banks are trading off profits for financial capital, i.e.,
for lower risk, rather than maximizing profits. We cannot reject the hypothesis that banks in the largest
size category, i.e., banks with assets over $6.72 billion are maximizing profits. We believe this is the
first direct empirical test of the objective function of bank managers.
7.3 Scale Economies
Table 4 reports scale economies estimates, which take into account the effect of output level,
output quality, and financial capital on cost. That is, when we compute SCALE, we take into account
how a change in output level or output quality affects financial capital, k, which in turn affects cost. As
indicated in the table, there are increasing returns to scale for banks in the three smallest size categories,
since the point estimates are significantly greater than one, and there are constant returns to scale at banks
in the largest size category, since the point estimates are insignificantly different from one. While the
point estimates suggest the average cost curve is U-shaped, the magnitudes are small, suggesting the
average cost curve is fairly flat. Thus, the results are not that different from Hughes and Mester (1993),
who found constant returns across the entire size range of banks using a similar sample but different
output definitions and treating financial capital as exogenous. The results are also consistent with
McAllister and McManus (1993), who find that after declining over smaller asset sizes, the average cost
curve flattens out.
PARTSCALE1, PARTSCALE2, and PARTSCALE3, the measures of scale economies that do not
take into account output quality and/or financial capital endogeneity, yielded estimates that were
significantly greater than one for smaller banks and insignificantly different from one for larger banks.
Although the divergence is greater for smaller banks, for all size banks, PARTSCALE3 >
PARTSCALE1> PARTSCALE2. This makes sense: recall that PARTSCALE3 holds quality constant
as y increases, but doesn’t take into account the endogeneity of k. That is, as output levels increase, k22
is held constant so default risk increases. Average costs appear to be declining more sharply here, i.e.,
the scale measure is high, because the cost of holding default risk constant as output levels increase is
not taken into account. PARTSCALE2 takes into account that k is endogenous and holds default risk
constant as output increases, but does not hold quality constant. As output levels increase, with no
change in q, the percentage of output that is nonperforming falls, i.e., the quality of output increases.
This is reflected in a less rapid decline in average costs, i.e., a lower scale measure. Since
PARTSCALE1 is based on the percentage increase in costs when output levels increase, with default risk
and quality both increasing as output levels increase, it lies between PARTSCALE3 and PARTSCALE2.
7.4 Scope Economies and Cost Complementarities
Table 5 displays the within-sample measures of global economies of scope. We also reported
those product-specific scope economies measures and cost complementarity measures that were
significantly different from zero for banks in at least one of the size categories or at the overall mean.
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Global economies of scope is insignificantly positive for the mean bank and across the size categories,
suggesting that there is no evidence of significant cost savings or dissavings from producing the five
outputs in a multiproduct firm compared with producing the outputs in five separate, relatively specialized
firms.
The within-sample product-specific scope economies measures are interesting in that they reveal
some evidence of economies of scope. For all size banks, WSCOPE5, WSCOPE24, and WSCOPE45 are
significantly positive. For banks in the two smaller size categories, WSCOPE15 and WSCOPE23 are
significantly positive, and for banks in the two larger categories, WSCOPE35 is significantly positive.
Recall that WSCOPET> 0 means that there are cost savings from having nonspecialized banks producing
17At the mean bank and for the four size categories at which we evaluate within-sample economies
WSCOPE(y) is well defined. In our sample, the minimum levels of the outputs (in billions of dollars)23
all the outputs compared to splitting up the outputs into banks that specialize in producing mainly the
outputs in T and banks that specialize in producing mainly the outputs not in T. Our measures seem to
suggest that there may be some apparent cost savings in producing business loans, y2, together with
securities, y5, since in each of the significant WSCOPET statistics, y2 is separated from y5. Inspection
of the cost complementarities measures confirms this: business loans and securities are significant cost
complements, so that splitting up these two outputs would be costly for the bank. This result provides
some support to those that have argued that “narrow” banks would be at a cost disadvantage because of
their inability to capture scope economies [see Litan (1987) for more on economies of scope and narrow
banks].
The cost complementarities estimates also indicate that some outputs are non-complements. (This
is why we do not find global scope economies.) For example, business loans, y2, and loans to
individuals, y3, and business loans, y2, and other loans, y4, are non-complements. Since these loans are
probably made to distinct groups of customers, there is probably no opportunity to share information or
credit evaluations, and this might lead to noncomplementarity given the bank has limited resources. On
the other hand, real estate loans, yl, and loans to individuals, y3, are likely to be made to the same set
of customers (since residential mortgages are a large part of y1), and we find they are cost complements.
These results differ from those in Hughes and Mester (1993), who found evidence of scope
diseconomies at the largest banks in the sample. While the samples and output definitions differ
somewhat between the two papers, the main difference is that here we endogenize the bank’s choice of
financial capital, whereas Hughes and Mester (1993) measured scope economies at a fixed level of
financial capital, k. As they say in footnote 8, this makes their measures of scope economies difficult
to interpret, since k is not permitted to vary with output level.
calculated at each bank’s (both specialized and nonspecialized
account for the difference in the results.
Here, the scope economies statistics are
banks) optimal capital level. This may24
8. Conclusion
This paper presents evidence on the objective function of bank management—that is, are they risk
neutral and maximize expected profits or are they risk-averse and trade off profit for risk reduction? We
extend the model of Hughes and Mester (1993) to allow a bank’s choice of its financial capital level to
reflect its preference for return versus risk. A multiproduct cost function, which incorporates asset
quality and the risk faced by a bank’s uninsured depositors, is derived from a model of utility
maximization. The utility function represents the bank management’s preferences defined over asset
levels, asset quality, capital level, and profit. Endogenizing the bank’s choice of capital level in this way
permits the demand for financial capital to deviate from its cost-minimizing level. The model consists
of the cost function, share equations, and demand for financial capital equation, which are estimated
jointly. We then are able to explicitly test whether bank managers are acting in shareholders’ interest
and maximizing expected profits, or whether they are maximizing a utility function that exhibits risk
aversion.
We find evidence that banks in the three smallest size quartiles are acting in a risk-averse manner,
and maximizing a utility function that trades off profits for risk reduction. For banks in the largest size
quartile, with assets over $6.72 billion, we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are acting to maximize
expected profits. Our estimates of scale and scope economies based on this model show slight economies
of scale at banks at the three smallest size categories and constant returns at banks in the largest size
category. We also find some evidence of product-specific scope economies, cost complementarity
between some outputs, and cost non-complementarity between other outputs.25
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